Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 13
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey

Article 13

January 1983

Immigration Law
Kathryn L. Anderson

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Immigration Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kathryn L. Anderson, Immigration Law, 13 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1983).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Anderson: Immigration Law

IMMIGRATION LAW
THE RIGHT OF ASYLUM: THE NINTH CIRCUIT ADOPTS
THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TEST FOR THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980
A.

INTRODUCTION

In McMullen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1
the Ninth Circuit held that the Refugee Act of 19801 (Refugee
Act) requires that Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) factual
findings be reviewed under the substantial evidence test. Under
this standard, the court found that the evidence failed to support the BIA's determination that petitioner was unlikely to suffer persecution if deported to the Republic of Ireland (Ireland).
Petitioner, a former Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA)3 member, faced possible execution by the PIRA for refusing to carry out the kidnapping of an American bar owner.·
Petitioner used an assumed name to obtain a visa and fled to the
United States. II Hoping to obtain asylum, he offered to cooperate
with federal authorities upon his arrival'The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) then
1. 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Choy, J.; the other panel members were Hug
and Schroeder, JJ.).
2. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). See infra text accompanying notes 18-32.
3. The Provisional Irish Republican Army is an offshoot of the paramilitary Irish
Republican Army (IRA). The PIRA was formed to protest the perceived inefficacy of the
IRA to protect the Catholic population in Northern Ireland from British Army and Protestant assaults. Both groups purport to use terrorism to attain the unification and independence of Ireland. They are not officially supported by any government. In September
of 1974, petitioner formally resigned from the PIRA because of ideological differences.
658 F.2d at 1314.
4. Id. Petitioner testified at the deportation proceedings that a friend warned him
that he would be murdered by the PIRA due to his non-cooperation in the kidnapping.
Petitioner had had a complicated involvement with the PIRA since his desertion from
the British Army. Id.
5. Id. See infra note 8 for the grounds of petitioner's deportation.
6. Petitioner cooperated with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and
with Scotland Yard investigators in the United States. Id.
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brought deportation proceedings against petitioner. The immigration judge found that petitioner was not deportable as
charged,? pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (the
Act).8
.
Based upon petitioner's oral testimony' and documentary
evidence,lo the immigration judge withheld deportation because
the government of Ireland was unable to control the PIRA activities, and "[i]f [petitioner] were to be returned to that country,
he would suffer persecution within the meaning of the [United
Nations] Convention,ll Protocol,I1 and section 243(h)13 [of the
Act]."I. Further, the judge found that petitioner was not a security risk to the United States and that therefore deportation
should be withheld. 111
7. In re McMullen, No. A·23054818, Decision of Immigration Judge at 1 (Jan. 10,
1980).
8. Petitioner was charged with violating the following Immigration & Nationality
Act sections: (1) § 241(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976) (alien excludable at entry upon
the order of the .Attorney General); (2) § 212(a)(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1976) (ob·
tained visa or other documentation by fraud, or willfully misrepresenting a material
fact); and (3) § 212(a)(26), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(26) (1976) (not in possession of a valid
nonimmigrant visa). 658 F.2d at 1314·15.
9. Petitioner testified that the PIRA was aware of his cooperation with authorities,
and that he was considered a traitor who should be executed. 658 F.2d at 1314.
10. "McMullen submitted over 100 pages of exhibits consisting of newspaper and
magazine articles, scholarly reports and other publications dqcumenting PIRA terrorist
activities." I d.
11. The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for
signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. The United States has never adhered to the
Convention, which accorded protection to the refugees at that time. The relevant portion
of Article 33 reads as follows: "No contracting state shall expel or return (refouler) a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a partic·
ular social group or political opinion." See generally Note, The Right of Asylum Under
United States Law, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1125 (1980). [hereafter Right of Asylum]
12. The United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for
signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268. The Proto·
col espouses all of the substantive provisions of the Convention and defines "refugee" as
a person who, "owing to well·founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, reli·
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country." Convention article 1 is adopted by Protocol
article 1. The United States adhered to the Protocol effective November I, 1968. See
Right of Asylum, supra note 11, at 1126.
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976).
14. In re McMullen, supra note 7, at 5.
15. Id. at 9. The immigration judge based his decision primarily on the United
States' adherence to the principles of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees, supra note 12. The relevant part of article 33 of the Protocol reads as
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The BIA reversed on the ground that petitioner failed to
show a sufficient likelihood that he would suffer persecution if
deported to Ireland. 18 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, conceding
that the question was one of first impression, held that under
the provisions of the Refugee Act, the BIA's finding was not
supportable under the substantial evidence test.17
This note will discuss the significance of the Refugee Act,
its influence on the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, and analyze the
potential impact of the McMullen decision.
B.

BACKGROUND -

THE REFUGEE ACT OF

1980

The Refugee Act is a comprehensive measure designed to
deal with the admission of refugees, the granting of political asylum, and the provision of assistance to such persons. 18 "[The
Refugee Act) reflects one of the oldest themes in America's history - welcoming homeless refugees to our shores. It gives statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and
humanitarian concerns .... "19 The term "refugee" now means
any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality . . . and is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion . . . .10
follows:
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however,
be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds
for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in
which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment
of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the
community of that country.
16. 658 F.2d at 1315.
17. See Calhoun v. Bailer, 626 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
906 (1981) ("[TJhe substantial evidence test is quinteBSentially a case-by-case analysis
requiring review of the whole record.").
18. See generally 57 INTERPRETER RELEASES (American Council for Nationalities
Serv.) 133 (March 20, 1980) for a detailed analysis of the Refugee Act. See also Note,
The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DlBGO
L. REV. 9 (1981).
19. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d SeBS. 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 141.
20. The Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 2 [hereafter Refugee ActJ, at § 201(a), 8
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The new definition brings United States law into conformity
with international treaty obligations under the United Nations
Protocorn and Convention. 22 There is now a clear-cut distinction
between refugees, aliens outside the United States,23 and asylees,
aliens who are physically present in the United States or at a
land border or port of entry.2.
Since petitioner had entered the United States illegally, he
could apply for asylum if the Attorney General determined that
he was a refugee within the meaning of the Refugee Act. 211 Additionally, the power to grant asylum lay within the discretion of
the immigration judge. 28
Prior to the enactment of the Refugee Act, the decision to
withhold deportation was a matter solely within the Attorney
General's discretion.27 Now, however, the amended section
243(h) states that "[t]he Attorney General shall not deport or
return an alien . . . to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in
such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."28 Once eligibility has been shown, relief is mandatory, not discretionary,
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(a) (1976 & Supp. 1982).
21. See supra note 12.
22. See supra note 11. The Refugee Act expanded the grounds of persecution to
include nationality and membership in a particular social group. See supra text accompanying note 20.
23. Refugee Act § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(a) (1976 & Supp. 1982).
24. Refugee Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1976 & Supp. 1982).
25.Id.
26. See Matter of Lam, 18 I & N Dec. 2857 (BIA 1981). Interim regulations promulgated pursuant to the Refugee Act similarly provide that asylum applications made after
the institution of exclusion or deportation proceedings shall be considered by immigration judges. In re McMullen, supra note 7, at 6 n.4. See a/so 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1981)
(the alien may be granted asylum at the discretion of the Attorney General).
27. Immigration & Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § llf, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1965) amended by Pub. L. No. 96-212, tit. II, § 203(e) (1980). The section formerly read:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of
any alien within the United States to any country in which in
his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion and for such period
of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.
(emphasis added).
28. Refugee Act of 1980, § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(l) (1976 & Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
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unless an alien is excludable under section 243(h)(2).29 Nationality and membership in a particular social group have also been
added to the bases of persecution within the definition of "refugee." Thus, in McMullen, the INS conceded that persecution
within the meaning of section 243(h) can include persecution by
non-governmental groups such as the PIRA.30
Past decisions indicate that the Ninth Circuit gave extreme
deference to the Attorney General's decisions. 31 Under former
section 243(h), the Ninth Circuit searched only for a lack of due
process or an abuse of discretion by the immigration judge or
the BIA. Before McMullen, the Ninth Circuit had explicitly refused to apply. substantial evidence review to a BIA finding of
ineligibility for section 243(h) relief. 32
C.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING

In McMullen, the Ninth Circuit needed only to review the
BIA's finding that petitioner was not likely to suffer persecution
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1976 & Supp. 1982). This section reads in relevant part:
Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any alien if the Attorney
General determines that (A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise partici·
pated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion;
(B) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States;
(C) there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has
committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United
States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States; or
(D) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a
danger to the security of the United States.
30. 658 F.2d at 1315 n.2 (petitioner must show that the government of the country
he would be deported to is unwilling or unable to control that group).
31. See, e.g., Kasravi v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir.
1968) (in reviewing special inquiry officer's decision at deportation hearing, court of appeals could not substitute its opinion for that of Attorney General); Asghari v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 396 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1968) (there was no lack of due process or abuse of discretion when the record amply. supported the refusal of the Attorney
General to withhold deportation); Namkung v. Boyd, 226 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1955) (under
statute authorizing Attorney General to withhold deportation of an alien to a country
where he would be subjected to physical persecution, withholding deportation for such
reason rests wholly in Attorney General's or his delegate's administrative judgment and
opinion and the court may not substitute its own judgment).
32. 658 F.2d at 1316. See cases cited supra note 31.
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by the PIRA.88 Since the Refugee Act amended section 243(h) of
the Act, the Ninth Circuit recognized the urgent need to devise
an appropriate standard of review. The court agreed with the
petitioner's contention that the new mandatory language of section 243(h) justified replacing the abuse-of-discretion standard
with the substantial evidence standard. 84 Because the charge to
the agency changes from discretionary to imperative, the court
recognized that its role as a reviewing court necessarily must
change. 8&
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that with the removal of absolute discretion formerly vested with the BIA, a factual determination is now required. Thus, the BIA must withhold deportation if "certain facts exist."8e Indeed, the Ninth Circuit had
previously recognized that "if such a finding of fact were required by the statute, the decision of the Attorney General
would be subject to review in order to determine whether such
findings were supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence. "87 The McMullen court indicated that the substantial evidence standard of review has normally been applicable to agency findings arising from public, record-producing
33. 658 F.2d at 1315. The elements necessary to withhold peitioner's deportation
were:
[1) A likelihood of persecution; a threat to life or freedom.
[2) Persecution by the government or by a group which the government is unable
to control.
[3) Persecution resulting from petitioner's political beliefs.
[4) Petitioner is not a danger or a security risk to the United States.
[d. Although the Immigration Judge found all four elements present, the BIA reversed
on the ground that the first two elements were not proven. Thus, McMullen limited its
review to the first two elements. The Ninth Circuit court stated that it need not and did
not reach the question of whether the BIA's rejection of petitioner's alternate
claim-that he would be persecuted by the government of Ireland-was supported by
substantial evidence. [d. at 1320 n.6.
34. [d. at 1316.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 18-32.
36. 658 F.2d at 1316.
37. Kasravi v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 400 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1968)
(emphasis added).
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proceedings. 38 Because the substantial evidence test follows from
legislative changes in the section, it does not conflict with prior
Ninth Circuit precedent. 39
In light of the new standard, the court reviewed the BIA's
finding that there was no likelihood of petitioner being subject
to persecution. The court first categorized the evidence40 according to the elements petitioner sought to prove: first, that the
PIRA systematically tortures and murders traitors; second, that
petitioner is perceived as a traitor; and finally, that the government of Ireland is unable to control the PIRA.41
After close scrutiny of the extensive documentation of PIRA
activities,42 the court was convinced that the PIRA regularly
maims and executes informers and defectors.4a Since the evidence clearly indicated a pattern in the PIRA's activities and
since the INS did not challenge the accuracy of the evidence, the
court concluded that the PIRA is a clandestine, terrorist organization, not subject to government control. 44
The court further found that the burden is on th~ alien to
prove the likelihood of persecution and that petitioner met this
burden.411 The main thrust of the court's determination was that
38. 658 F.2d at 1315. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971).
39. 658 F.2d at 1316.
40. Petitioner had presented the following evidence: His lengthy and detailed testimony, both written and delivered at the hearing under direct and cross-examination,
newspaper and magazine articles, book excerpts, investigative reports and transcripts of
related proceedings. ld. at 1317.
41. ld.
42. Petitioner's extensive documentation contained, inter alia, reports of PIRA executions and torture of informers and opponents from the London Sunday Times, Time
magazine, the Informer, Newsweek, the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, a
study by the Institute for Military studies, University of Lancaster, England, the Amnesty International Reports on the Republic of Ireland, and Deutsch & Magowan, Northern Ireland, 1968-74, A Chronology of Events. These reports specified names, dates and
places of the PIRA's persecution of defectors. ld. at 1318 n.4. The Ninth Circuit stated
that the evidence was relevant in determIning whether petitioner was likely to face persecution upon deportation. ld. at 1319.
43. ld. at 1318.
44. ld. at 1319.
45. ld. at 1317. The BIA found that petitioner's personal testimony was not credible
because it was self-serving. The BIA also disregarded the evidence of PlRA terrorism
because it did not refer specifically to persecution directed at petitioner. The INS did
not, however, submit independent evidence showing petitioner's lack of credibility and
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the INS failed to submit any evidence contradicting petitioner's
claim. 48 It emphasized that the INS never seriously disputed the
truth of petitioner's claimed history of PIRA association and
defection. 47
The Ninth Circuit noted that the immigration judge found
petitioner's testimony credible after having petitioner testify
and observing his demeanor.48 The court then considered the
judge's findings because it conflicted with those of the BIA!'
Further, the court made clear that its role is not to make an
independent finding of credibility,IIO but to review petitioner's
evidence to determine whether the BIA's rejection of it was reasonably supported. III The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
BIA's finding was unsupported by substantial evidence. II!
Finally, the Ninth Circuit recognized the plight of asylum
seekersll8 by expressing its concern about the lack of guidance
from the BIA in the proof required in a case of alleged persecuinaccuracy of his claim. [d. at 1317-18.
46. [d. at 1317. The Ninth Circuit engaged in a lengthy review of petitioner's testimony that the PIRA had specifically threatened his life, that he defected by fleeing to
the United States, that he cooperated with federal authorities and Scotland Yard, and
that the PIRA considered him a traitor. [d.
47. [d. at 1317-18. Indeed, the INS simply argued that petitioner's testimony was
inherently unbelievable because a petitioner in a deportation case is motivated to lie in
support of his own case. The INS neither argued that the testimony was inherently inconsistent nor that it lacked veracity.
48. [d. at 1318.
49. [d. Ct. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951) (recognizing
that in applying the substantial evidence test in a labor context that "evidence supporting a conclusion may be less substantial when an impartial, experienced examiner who
has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn conclusions different from
the Board.").
50. 658 F.2d at 1318.
51. [d. See Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461, 493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 884 (1959) (reviewing court applying substantial evidence test must consider
evidence contravening the agency's determination).
52. 658 F.2d at 1319. The Ninth Circuit found that petitioner's desire, expressed in
earlier proceedings, to be deported to the Republic of Ireland rather than the United
Kingdom, had little or no probative value. Also, the court did not refute petitioner's
claim of possible harm simply because his family safely resides in the Republic of Ireland; there was no evidence to indicate that the informer's family would be attacked.
Rather the court chose to believe that the PIRA operates under its own well developed
code of justice, and that it is very specific in its choice of victims. [d. at 1318-19.
53. [d. at 1319. The court noted that if petitioner, a well known former PIRA member with an extensively documented claim of probable persecution, failed to present sufficient proof, then it would be nearly impossible for anyone in petitioner's position to
make out a case under § 243(h). [d.
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tion by a clandestine, terrorist group.1I4
D.

ANALYSIS

The McMullen decision signals an end to the often narrow
abuse-of-discretion standard of review.&& However, the Ninth
Circuit adopted a substantial evidence test to review BIA factual
findings narrower than that used in reviewing factual findings of
other government agencies. 1I8 The decision could have set a more
forceful precedent had the court delineated the test in clearer
language and based its holding directly on the statutory amendment. Instead the Ninth Circuit cited only one ruling,II7 without
more, to guide the BIA and immigration practitioners in applying the test. Indeed the test as explained in McMullen offers
only a vague case-by-case analysis. liS
As one commentator has observed, the differences between
54. ld. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook on Procedure and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, 11 196, p.47 (1979), which reads in
relevant part:
[A]n applicant may not be able to support his statements by
documentary or other proof, and cases in which an applicant
can provide evidence of all his statements will be the exception rather than the rule. In most cases, a person fleeing from
persecution will have arrived with barest nece88ities and very
frequently even without personal documents.
55. See Hosseinmandi v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 405 F.2d 25 (9th Cir.
1969) (decision of special inquiry officer denying stay of deportation to citizen of Iran,
who applied for stay on ground that he would face persecution in Iran because of his
political beliefs and activities in the United States, was not an abuse of discretion).
Under this standard, if the BIA has employed the correct legal standard and followed
the proper procedures, its decision will stand unless arbitrary, capricious or based upon
invidious classifications. See, e.g., Pereira-Diaz v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
551 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1977). Thus, national, domestic or foreign policY concerns
may have improperly played a role in the BIA decisions, even though they are illegitimate components of an asylum decision under the ProtOcol. See also Right 01 Asylum,
supra note 11, at 1133; S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 184 (1979).
56. CI. Espinoza-Espinoza v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 554 F.2d 921, 926
(9th Cir. 1977) (with regard to the standard of review on appeal, this court has held that
the test is whether "the agency's order is supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole. "). Although this case did not deal
with § 243(h), the Ninth Circuit, in McMullen, recognized the change to mandatory language in the Refugee Act and made the test applicable to BIA factual findings. 658 F.2d
at 1316.
57. Calhoun v. Bailer, 626 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906
(1981).
58. 626 F.2d at 148.
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the abuse-of-discretion and substantial evidence standards have
been and still are blurred. 1I9 Thus, literal interpretation of the
formulas as applied to a section 243(h) case cannot always produce sensible or consistent results. eo Most important, the "key to
scope of review is not the choice of formulas or standards . . . .
The key lies in the prevailing judicial choice of what content to
put into the concept of reasonableness. ''61
Now that withholding of deportation is no longer a matter
of discretion, judicial review must focus on whether the BIA reasonably determined that the alien would not be persecuted upon
deportation. From this standpoint, the Ninth Circuit's reliance
on general principles of administrative law62 was not only misplaced but unnecessary. The better view requires the adoption
of the standard applicable to the Act itself. e8 Although the legislative history of the Refugee Act is silent on the reviewability
standard,e. it does indicate the legislative intent to conform
United States law with the Protocol. Since the Refugee Act
mandates a factual determination of the possibility that a petitioner will be subject to persecution upon deportation, the Refugee Act would be a proper standard to follow. ell By engaging in
an intensive review of evidence supporting a section 243(h) decision, the Ninth Circuit played a leading role in giving the full
effect to the principles and language of the Protocol and the
Refugee Act. ee
59. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.00-1 (Supp. 1982).
60. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 55, point out that "if administrative agencies were totally free to find whatever facts they pleased, without regard to the evidence
or the reasonableness of inferences that might be drawn from the evidence, agencies
could so alter the operation of statutes or legal rules as to effectively change their meaning." Id. at 184.
61. K. DAVIS, supra note 59, at 528 (emphasis added).
62. 658 F.2d at 1316. Presumably, the Ninth Circuit means that under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976), the substantial evidence test is used
only for questions of fact that have been the subject of a hearing with a determination on
the record. Since the test has already been spelled out in the Act itself, see intra note 63,
reliance on the Administrative Procedure Act is unnecessary.
63. Refugee Act § 106(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(4) (1976 & Supp. 1982). This statute
provides that administrative findings of fact must be supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.
64. H.R. REP. No. 212, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1979). Ct. S. REP. No. 256, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADMIN. NEWS 523.
65. See supra note 63.
66. One other Circuit has followed the Ninth Circuit's interpretation. See Stevic v.
Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), where the Second Circuit reversed the BIA, holding
that it employed too onerous a standard in requiring asylum claimants to show a "clear
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SIGNIFICANCE

The McMullen decision is of significant precedential value
and therefore of importance to immigration practitioners. First,
the Ninth Circuit espoused the United Nations' concern that
refugees fleeing political persecution are often unable to present
sufficient evidence to support their claims.S'7 Therefore, newspaper articles and other secondary evidence are now relevant m
evaluating a claim of feared persecution. S8
Second, the language of McMullen strongly indicates the
Ninth Circuit's dissatisfaction with the INS' failure to submit
independent evidence to contradict a petitioner's claim.s9 It
therefore follows that the burden shifts to the INS to attack a
petitioner's claim by presenting its own evidence once the petitioner meets his burden of proof. This aspect of the opinion,
however, remains unclear since the court did not specify how
much evidence is needed to prove that a petitioner would be
persecuted upon deportation. '70
In McMullen, the Ninth Circuit took a positive step in interpreting the Refugee Act consistent with its legislative intent.
Indeed, Congress' adoption of the Refugee Act clearly evinces
the United States' continued commitment to welcome and provide assistance to homeless refugees. The McMullen decision, if
applied with reasonableness and care, can provide relief to petitioners whose claims of likely persecution have merit while also
probability" of persecution. Id. at 409.
67. See supra notes 52-53.
68. For the list of evidence submitted by petitioner, see supra notes 40 and 42. In
McMullen, the Ninth Circuit recognized that in political asylum cases, it is difficult to
imagine what other forms of testimony a petitioner could present other than his own
statements and those of his family members. 658 F.2d at 1319. See also Matter of
Sihasale, 111. & N. Dec. 531 (1966) for the proposition that a petitioner's own affidavit is
usually not only the best evidence available, but often the only evidence of a persecution
claim. See generally Note, Corolian v. Immigration & Naturalization Service: A Closer
Look at Immigration Law and The Political Refugee, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 133
(1978-79).
69. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
70. See 658 F.2d at 1319-20. The Ninth Circuit conceded that in McMullen, petitioner was a well known former member of PIRA with an extensive claim of probable
persecution. Thus, the opinion leaves uncertain the weight of the burden of proof imposed on future petitioners. It therefore remains to be determined whether a meritorious
claim can be made with evidence not as extensive as that presented in McMullen.
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allowing room for deference to the expertise of the BIA.
Michael S. F. Yu*

ADAMS V. HOWERTON: AVOIDING CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO IMMIGRATION POLICIES THROUGH
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Adams v. Howerton/ the Ninth Circuit confronted the
issues of whether a citizen's spouse within the meaning of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 19521 (the Act) must be an
individual of the opposite sex, and, whether the statute, if so
interpreted, was constitutional. Relying on and exercising deference to congressional intent and power over immigration matters,a the court held that spousal status under
the Act was conI,'
ferred only upon parties to a heterosexual 'marriage.4 The court
further found that Congress' decision to limit spousal status to
heterosexual marriages had a rational basis and comported with
the due process clause and its equal protection requirements. Ii
Plaintiff, an American male, and Sullivan, an alien male,
were married in Colorado following the expiration of Sullivan's
visitor's visa. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff petitioned the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for classification of
Sullivan as an immediate relative based on Sullivan's alleged
status as plaintiff's spouse. This petition was denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Plaintiff and Sullivan then challenged the Board's decision on both statutory and constitutional grounds in the district
court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
-Second Year student, University of Santa Clara School of Law.

1. 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.) (per Wallace, J., the other panel members were Tang, J.,
and Turrentine, D. J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3494 (1982).
2. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976).
3. 673 F.2d at 1040.
4. Id. at 1042.
5. Id. at 1041.
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the INS.s
B.

BACKGROUND-THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY

ACT

As originally conceived, the Act provided a system for annual immigration quotas, and a comprehensive scheme for the
admission and exclusion of aliens. 7 In 1965, the Act was
amended, and the former quota system replaced by a scheme
qualifying aliens for admission based on (1) the date of application, and (2) the preference category into which the alien fell by
reason of his relationship to a United States citizen or resident,
employment, skill or lack thereof.S
.
Spouses and unmarried children of United States citizens
have long been admitted without regard to numerical limitation,
and are granted automatic preference status. Section 201(b) of
the Act provides for this preference and confers "immediate relative status" which qualifies for admission purposes the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States.'
Neither the Act nor its 1965 amendments directly define the
term "spouse", and only one restriction on this term is contemplated within the Act. Section 101(35) excludes from preferential status a wife or husband spouse who are not in the physical
presence of each other, unless the marriage has been consummated. 10 Thus, the Act is silent on whether or not the term
would include a spouse of the same sex.
A related provision, section 204(c), provides for the non-approval of preferred immigrant status to spouses of United States
citizens or permanent alien residents who, as determined by the
Attorney General, are found to have entered into marriage for
the purpose of evading immigration laws. l l In conjunction with
6. 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
7. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1230 (1976).
8. 8 u.s.c. § 1151 (1976).
9. 8 u.s.c. § 1151(b) (1976) provides: "The 'immediate relatives' referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall mean the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the
United States .... "
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (1976) provides: "The term [sic) 'spouse', 'wife', or 'husband' do not include a spouse, wife or husband by reason of any marriage ceremony
where the contracting parties thereto are not physically present in the presence of each
other, unless the marriage shall have been conaumated."
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (1976).
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section 212(a)(19),U the Ninth Circuit has upheld the denial of
admission of spouses who enter the marriage relationship for the
purpose of acquiring "immediate relative status" and evading
immigration laws. 18
Also modified by the 1965 amendments were the provisions
requiring the mandatory exclusion of certain classes of aliens.
Section 212(a) specifies the various classes of aliens who are ineligible to receive visas, and are excludable from admission into
the United States. Subsection four of this provision was modified to exclude "[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality,
or sexual deviation, or a mental defect. "14 The phrase "sexual
deviation" was added to this category and, based on its legislative history, was intended to exclude homosexuals. III Prior to the
addition of this phrase, the term "psychopathic personality" was
interpreted by the courts as including homosexuals as an excludable alien class. IS Based on the Act's legislative history, the Fifth
Circuit found, in Quiroz v. Nee lly,t '7. that "[w]hatever the phrase
'psychopathic personality' may mean to the psychiatrist, to the
Congress it was intended to include homosexuals and sex perverts."18 Following the 1965 amendments, the United States Supreme Court, in Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,18 concluded that "Congress used the phrase 'psychopathic
personality' not in the clinical sense, but to effectuate its purpose to exclude from entry all homosexuals and other sex
perverts. "10
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1976) provides for exclusion from admission: "Any alien
who seeks to procure, or has sought to procure, or has procured a visa or other documentation, or seeks to enter the United States, by fraud, or by willfully misrepresenting a
material fact . . . ."
13. Garcia-Jaramillo v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 604 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir.
1979).
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1976).
15. S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Se88., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 3328, 3343.
16. See Lavoie V. Immigation & Naturalization Serv., 418 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1969);
Boutilier V. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 363 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 387
U.S. 118 (1967); United States V. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956).
17. 291 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1961).
18. ld. at 907.
19. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
20. ld. at 122. This interpretation of congressional intent was challenged in a recent
district court opinion, Lesbian Gay Freedom Day Comm., Inc. V. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1982). The court found that
§ 212(a)(4) was not intended as a per se exclusion of homosexual aliens because, by its
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The question presented in Adams was how to reconcile the
apparently conflicting provisions of the Act, one granting
spouses preferential status, the other treating homosexuals as a
non preferred class and automatically excludable.
C.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Adams case presented two major issues concerning the
constitutionality of a federal statute pertaining to immigration.
The first issue required the interpretation of the term "spouse"
within the meaning of the Act.21 If the term "spouse" was defined as including only heterosexual spouses, the second issue,
the constitutionality of the interpretation, would follow. sS
In determining whether a citizen's spouse within the meaning of the Act must be an individual of the opposite sex, the
Ninth Circuit applied a two step analysis: first, whether the marriage was valid under state law; and second, whether the state
approved marriage would qualify under the Act. S3
Reviewing the Colorado statutes governing marriage, Sf the
court concluded that Colorado neither expressly permitted nor
prohibited homosexual marriages. sli However, the court did note
that these statutes appeared to contemplate the marriage relationship as solely being between a man and a woman. ss Yet, the
court found it unnecessary to determine the validity of the
plaintiff's marriage under Colorado laws. Within constitutional
limits, the court reasoned, Congress has plenary power to deterexpress language, the section was an exlusionary provision based on medical grounds.
Congress could not have intended § 212(a)(4) as an exclusion of individuals who had no
medically recognized mental disorder or sexual deviation. The court noted that the medical community no longer views homosexuality as a mental illness, mental disorder or
sexual deviation. 541 F. Supp. at 585.
21. 673 F.2d at 1038.
22. Id.·
23. Id. This analysis was derived from cases interpreting the Act and its various
provisions. See United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264, 270 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 903 (1970) (construing statutes pertaining to registration and revocation of naturalization, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1306(a) and 1415(a)(3) (1970».
24. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2-101-14-2-104 (1973).The Board of Immigration Appeals has held that, in a visa petition proceeding, the validity of a marriage is governed
by the laws of the place of celebration. See In re Gamero, 14 I. & N. Dec. 674 (1974). See
also Gee Chee On v. Brownell, 253 F.2d 814, 817 (5th Cir. 1958).
25. 673 F.2d at 1039.
26.Id.
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mine the conditions under which immigration visas are issued.
"Therefore, the intent of Congress governs the conferral of
spouse status under section 201(b), and a valid marriage is determined only if Congress so intends."27
That Congress did not intent to confer spousal status to
parties in a homosexual marriage for the purpose of acquiring
"immediate relative status" was premised on three considerations. 28 First, the INS had interpreted the term "spouse" to exclude a person entering a homosexual marriage. 29 Because the
INS was the agency empowered by Congress to implement its
immigration directives, the court was required to follow the
agency's finding. Further, there was no indication found within
the Act, its 1965 amendments, or its legislative history which reflected an intent to include such individuals within the spousal
exemption provisions of the Act. Conversely, the court found its
support for concluding that Congress had intended to exclude
homosexual marriages from the protective sanctions of the
spousal exemption provisions in the Act's mandatory exclusion
provisions. Section 212(a)(4), excluding homosexuals from admissions, aptly served to reflect Congress' intent to apply the
term "spouse" only to parties in a heterosexual marriage.
The court further maintained that to ascertain and apply
the intent of Congress, it was required to interpret each sanction
within the Act consistently with the language of the other sections, and in light of the purposes of the Act as a whole. 30 Thus,
a consistent construction of the provisions granting spouses
preferential status and the provision excluding homosexuals
from admissions led the court to conclude "that Congress intended that only partners in heterosexual marriages be considered spouses under section 201(b)."31
Recognizing Congress' plenary power to admit or exclude
27. 673 F.2d at 1039.
28. Id. at 1040.
29. The court noted its obligation to accord substantial deference to the statutory
construction given by the agency charged by Congress with its enforcement, and to follow it "unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong." New York Dep't of
Social Servo V. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973).
30. See Philbrook V. Goldgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975).
31. 673 F.2d at 1041.
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aliens from entry,32 the Ninth Circuit declined to address the
nature of plaintiff's claimed constitutional right and whether it
was implicated in the case. 33 The court's position of nonreview
gleaned support from the established principle of applying only
a limited judicial review to congressional decisions pertaining to
all matters concerning im'migration. 34 Additional support was
found in prior cases upholding the broad power of Congress to
determine immigration policies in the face of other constitutional challenges. 311
The court did, however, note the lack of clarity regarding
the scope of its limited review, and questioned whether the rational basis test must be met to validate legislation such as section 201(b) of the Act. Despite these unanswered questions, the
court held that "Congress' decision to confer spouse status
under section 201(b) only upon the parties to heterosexual marriages has a rational basis. "36 Congress rationally intended to
deny preferential' status to spouses of homosexual marriages;
thus, the court maintained, "we need not further probe and test
the justifications for the legislative decision."37 Based on congressional power in immigration matters, and a rational basis for
excluding homosexual spouses from the Act's spousal exemption
provision, the court held that section 201(b) was not unconstitutional because it denied spouses of homosexual marriages the
preference accorded spouses of heterosexual marriages. 38
32. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972);
Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).
33. 673 F.2d at 1041. Appellants argued that the statute, so interpreted, violated the
equal protection clause and abridged their fundamental right to marry. This right was
first considered a right of fundamental importance in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978), a case involving a traditional heterosexual marriage.
34. 673 F.2d at 1041.
35. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (rejecting challanges based on sex discrimination and denial of constitutional interest in family relationships); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (rejecting a first amendment free speech challenge); Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (rejecting a due process
challenge). But see Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., supra note 20 (per se exclusion
of homosexual aliens from entry into United States violated first amendment rights of
free speech and association of homosexual citizens).
36. 673 F.2d at 1042.
37. [d. at 1043, quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. at 799.
38. [d.
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D. CRITIQUE
In Adams, the Ninth Circuit limited its inquiry to statutory
interpretation. In so doing, the court cautiously adhered to well
sanctioned notions of "limited review" and "judicial deference"
to congressional decision-making power over immigration matters. This position carefully avoided discussion of the real issues
in Adams-whether section 201(b) violated the equal protection
clause because it discriminated on the basis of sex and homosexuality, and/or whether it abridged plaintiff's fundamental right
to marry. The decision presents troubling questions concerning
the use of "limited" review and "judicial deference" where constitutional claims and personal rights of American citizens are
asserted.
The court's interpretation of the controlling prOVISIOns
within the Act was undeniably correct. Spouses of American citizens are granted "immediate relative status" under section
201(b),89 and based on judicial interpretation of congressional
intent, homosexuals are among the class of excludable aliens
under section 212(a)(4).40 It is therefore not unlikely that Congress intended to exclude homosexual spouses from section
201(b) immediate relative status. However, this limited statutory analysis, in combination with the practice of judicial deference, effectively assures that plaintiff's asserted constitutional
rights, and those similarly situated, will never receive judicial review. Thus, the use of limited review and judicial deference in
the area of immigration legislation is questionable when it results in the effective denial of asserted constitutional claims.
The broad power of Congress in matters of immigration is
well established. In Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, the
United States Supreme Court found that "over no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than
it is over [the admission of aliensl."4l This power is grounded in
notions of sovereignty, and justified as a necessary means to
maintain normal international relations and to defend the the
country against foreign encroachment and danger. 42 Immigration
·39. S U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1976).
40. s U.S.C. § 11S2(8)(4) (1976).
41. 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).
42. See Foo Vue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion
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policies, by nature, invoke international political questions and
disputes. Thus, the power of policy determination and implementation must be concentrated exclusively within the legislative branch of government. 48 That this concentration of power is
well established is evidenced by the high degree of judicial deference, and limited judicial review, accorded to legislation involving immigration decisions. The Supreme Court has consistently sustained Congress' plenary power to determine
immigration policies.44 The Court has conceded altogether that
Congress could enact statutes which if applied to citizens would
be found unconstitutional.411
Though the practice of judicial deference and limited review
properly serve to avoid selective enforcement of important policy considerations, at some point it must be questioned what, if
any, policy considerations truly are served if there is no real or
apparent correlation between the exercise of congressional power
in an immigration decision and the traditional justification for
its use. Assuming, arguendo, the Act's treatment of denying
homosexuals admission into the United States neither assisted
nor abated the traditional bases for congressional power to mold
immigration policies, i.e., maintenance of normal international
relations, the exercise of congressional power would seemingly
be without justification. Within this context, the traditional
practice of limited judicial review would effectively grant to
Congress an absolute, but baseless, power over all immigration
decisions. The traditional practice of judicial deference would
dissolve into judicial abdication.
Though it is clear that aliens have no constitutional right to
compel admission into the United States,48 the court's position
summarily denies the existence of plaintiff's asserted constitutional right to marry. The Supreme Court has confirmed that
the right to marry is of fundamental importance to all individualS. 47 Further, the Court has recognized "that freedom of perCase, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
43. Foo Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 706.
44. Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 123.
45. Mandel, 430 U.S. at 792.
46. Alvarez v. District Director of United States Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 539 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1976).
47. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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sonal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."48 Because of its fundamental nature, the abridgment of the right to marry is given strict scrutiny and demands
a compelling state interest. 49

Though whether or not the fundamental right to marry similarly extends to those individuals entering into nontraditional
homosexual marriages has not been reviewed by the Court,1I0
presumably the right to enjoy "freedom of personal choice" in
matters of family life should be afforded to all Americans. If this
is so, the enactment and the Ninth Circuit's interpretations of
sections 201(b) and 212(a)(4), as applied to American citizens,
would have to be found unconstitutional. Yet, through cautious
adherence to the position of limited review and judicial deference, the court in Adams afforded constitutional sanctions a potentially unconstitutional statute.
The court's recognition of this problem is seen in its citation
to the Supreme Court's dicta "that a statute could be so baseless
as to be violative of due process, and therefore beyond the power
of Congress."111 Conversely, the Adams court noted that some
questions pertaining to immigration matters could be so political
in nature as to be nonjusticiable. lI11 Yet, without deciding
whether plaintiff's claim fell within either of these categories,
the court simply stated that the exact outer boundaries of its
limited judicial review need not be delineated. 1I8
The statutes relied upon in Adams, sections 201(b) and in
particular 212(a)(4), are not based on concerns relating to immi48. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). Plaintiff's claim technically arose under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. However, in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Court found that
the Federal Government bears the same duty to uphold equal protection guarantees as
required by state governments under the fourteenth amendment.
49. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
50. The Supreme Court has dismissed cases challenging state statues authorizing
heterosexual, but .not homosexual marriages. Its dismissal of these cases was on grounds
of the lack of a substantial federal question. See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
However, this dismissal was prior to the Zablocki decision articulating the fundamental
right to marry.
51. 673 F.2d at 1042, quoting Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 529 (1956).
52. 673 F.2d at 1042, citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. at 793 n.5.
53. 673 F.2d at 1042.
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gration policies, and appear potentially violative of an alien's
right to due process. By their nature, these statutes also affect
the constitutional and personal rights of American citizens.
Thus, the question presented is not merely one of congressional
power in immigration matters, but one of congressional power,
albeit indirect, to resolve constitutional claims of American citizens. In other contexts, the dilemma of whether a statute violates a citizen's due process rights would be given close judicial
scrutiny and these rights minimally deserve judicial inquiry in
the context of immigration. Similarly, whether the Adams case
presents a political question requires judicial consideration and
recognition before it is determined to be nonjusticiable. Plaintiff's claim was not, however, afforded either one of these limited
judicial inquiries.

E.

CONCLUSION

Though the court's reliance on "limited review" and "judicial deference" is well sanctioned, its position leaves unchallenged the boundaries of congressional power over immigration
decisions. More significantly, the court's position denies a citizen's right to test his constitutional claim. Because the Supreme
Court has not addressed whether homosexual marriages are constitutionally protected, a review of a claim such as that
presented in Adams could potentially lead to identical results.
However, this potentiality does not serve to justify, nor to excuse, the summary denial of a citizen's asserted constitutional
claim.

Kathryn L. Anderson·

• Third year student, Golden Gate University School of Law.
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